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Abstract. In the last several decades, there has been an explosion of research concerning 
consciousness with some efforts at mathematical modelling. The purpose of this paper is to model 
conscious states using categorical constructions. In particular, this modelling captures temporality, 
the intentional structure of consciousness, and meaning fields, which provide the templates for 
occurrent events. The architecture of conscious states naturally lends itself to applications of 
category theory, more specifically to sheaf-like constructions in which the stacks over a site are 
topoi whose germs are the objects of the topoi. Each topos represents the potential experiential 
content of an individual where the objects represent meaning fields, the phenomenological subject is 
represented by the terminal object, and the morphisms from the terminal object into the objects, the 
elements, represent attentional targeting of the specific content of meaning fields yielding an 
individual=s subjective experience. Temporality is represented by movement along the objects of the 
site, with different possible realities denoted by switching between contravariant functors over the 
site. This is an innovative way of modelling conscious states with the possibility of creating 
potentially useful ways of thinking about them that could then be empirically tested. 
 
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 91E10 
 
Keywords. Consciousness, mathematical modelling, category theory, topoi, sheaves. 
 
The idea in this paper is to use category theoretical structures to model some of the distinctive 
features of conscious states. This follows upon earlier work that I have done using Grothendieck 
topoi to model conscious states as conceptualized by Edmund Husserl (Barušs, 1989) and the flicker 
aspect of physical reality in collapse-type quantum mind theories (Barušs, 2008). In that sense, the 
work presented here is a snapshot of a further stage of that modelling effort and not intended to be a 
completed model. 
 
Why category theory? Category theory was invented by Saunders Mac Lane and Samuel Eilenberg 
as a way of classifying universal structures that recur in different areas of mathematics. If these 
structures are universal in mathematics, then it is possible that they occur in Areality@ more generally, 
so that category theory could be an efficient way of conceptually capturing them. For instance, Mac 
Lane begins his discussion of categories by considering two transformations leading to the same 
result (Mac Lane, 1971). This is something that occurs in physical manifestation as well, so why not 
efficiently capture such sequences using categorical structures. 
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Category theory has arrived somewhat recently to mathematics, with the consequence that it has 
been under-utilized beyond the domain of its own investigation, and has not yet displaced older 
mathematical methods. For instance, the usual formalizations of quantum mechanics and quantum 
field theory depend upon the use of operators, Hilbert and Folk spaces, and so on, even though 
sheaves, which are also used in the modelling here, more naturally fit the nonlocal and contextual 
features of subatomic events than the tensor algebras (Abramsky & Brandenburger, 2011). Another 
beneficial aspect of categorical modelling in the context of quantum theory is its ability to model 
higher-level processes (Abramsky & Coecke, 2008). The use of categorical structures here has the 
same purpose of trying to capture the higher-level phenomenology of subjective states, rather than 
lower-level mechanisms, such as, for example, accumulator models do when used in decision 
theory. Indeed, Menas Kafatos and his colleagues have called for such applications of category 
theory and used them explicitly for modelling consciousness (Struppa, Kafatos, Roy, Kato, & 
Amoroso, 2002; Kafatos, & Kato, 2017). The modelling presented in this paper has been developed 
independently of their efforts. 
 
There are different variations on category theory by different authors so that, to be clear, I am using 
the structures that arise in the context of elementary topoi, which are specific types of categories that 
embed internal logic, and, in particular, following the nomenclature used by Robert Goldblatt 
(1979), although it becomes necessary to create additional mathematical formalisms in the course of 
this modelling. I will alternate between giving heuristic descriptions of what I am doing that do not 
require any expert knowledge with technical information about the mathematical constructions and 
how I am using them for the modelling, which do require familiarity with basic categorical 
constructions. 
 
1. Conscious States 
 
The notion of Aconscious states@ refers to sequences of subjectively experienced events characterized 
by the presence of existential qualia, i.e., the subjectively felt sense that existence is going on 
(Barušs, 1987; Barušs & Mossbridge, 2017). Such events include both those that reference physical 
manifestation as well as those that are purely imaginary. There are several features of that broadly 
conceptualized domain that, in particular, are being modelled here. 
 
1. Temporality. Based primarily on Julian Barbour=s theory of time (Barbour, 2000) and my 
examination of observation in collapse-type quantum mind theories (Barušs, 2008), Julia 
Mossbridge and I developed a theory of temporality whose main idea is that occurrent events consist 
of an apparent sequence of nows that arise from a pre-physical substrate. Thus, there are two 
temporal streams: the usual apparent linear time stream, as experienced subjectively or objectively 
through the use of chronometers, and Adeep time@ which orders the sequence of experienced nows. 
In this conceptualization, each now has an associated Apast@ and Afuture,@ though these are not 
necessarily actual Apasts@ and Afutures@ of deep time. Furthermore, there is a flicker aspect to reality, 
in that there is an Aoffset@ between the Aonset@ of the nows (Barušs & Mossbridge, 2017). 
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2. The view from somewhere. Conscious states are usually characterized by intentionality, in the 
sense that there exists a Aself@ directed toward Aobjects@ of experience. While it is possible to infer a 
Aview from nowhere,@ human experience is such that there is usually a view from somewhere 
(Nagel, 1986), arguably, even in cases of nondual consciousness. 
 
3. Meaning fields. I developed the theory of meaning fields as a way of capturing what appears to 
be the presence of meaning beyond the human. For the purposes of this modelling, meaning fields 
can be regarded as patterns existing in reality that structure occurrent events (Barušs, 2018). 
 
2. Categorical Structures 
 
The categorical structures that are to be used for this modelling include categories, topoi, and 
sheaves. However, for the purposes of this modelling, I modify the sheaves and introduce the 
notion of partial functors. The following is a somewhat intuitive description of these structures, 
with proper precision introduced as needed. Usually composition of mathematical structures that 
can be associated, typically functions, are written using backward notation, e.g., g(f(x)), which 
means, first apply f to x and then apply g to f(x). In this paper, for convenience, composition is 
written in forward notion, e.g., xfg, which means, first do x, then f, then g, with the exception of the 
membership relation, denoted by ε which is written in the usual, hybrid fashion. 
 
A category is a collection of objects and arrows (also called morphisms), such that each arrow has 
an object as a domain and an object as a codomain. The arrows are closed under the operation of 
composition, they are associative, and identity arrows exist for each object. Perhaps the most 
obvious category is the category Set in which the objects are sets and the arrows are functions. The 
category of categories has categories as its objects, and functors, structure-preserving 
transformations, as its arrows. Contravariant functors change the directions of arrows in their 
image. A topos is a category with additional structure. Such structure includes a terminal object 
(usually denoted by 1) which has the property that there is a unique arrow from every object in the 
topos to that terminal object. 
 
Now we consider a contravariant functor, called a stack, from an arbitrary category C to Set. The 
initial category C is called a base space, the image of an object a is the object aF, called a stack, 
and an element x of aF is a germ. As we can see in Figure 1, germs are naturally carried forward 
from stack to stack. 
 
What we notice here is that there is a lower layer of objects a, b, c and so on, joined by arrows f, g 
and so on. This is the base space. Only two objects and three arrows are shown here for illustrative 
purposes. There would be, in general, an infinite number of objects and arrows in a category. And 
there could be an infinite number of arrows between any two objects. Then there is an upper layer 
of balloons, which are just sets of elements. Again, there would be an infinite number of such 
balloons, one for each of the objects in the base space. The elements of those sets are called 
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Agerms.@ There are also arrows fF and gF, which were elevated by the functor F from the base 
space. Those arrows carry all of the germs from the stack aF to the stacks bF and cF. Now, we are 
going to introduce further structure, called a Apretopology,@ on the base space, that will allow us to 
add more features to the modelling. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
So, we further suppose that C has a pretopology, denoted by Cov, which is to say that there are 
covers of objects, which consist of collections of arrows with some additional properties, whose 
codomains are those objects. We also introduce a compatibility condition for the arrows of covers 
as follows: For a contravariant functor F, given any cover {fx: ax  a: x ε X} ε aCov and any 
collection of germs {sx ε axF : x ε X} that are pairwise compatible, i.e., that can be pulled back to 
the same germ in (ax a ay)F, then there is exactly one sa ε aF so that sa (fxF) = sx, x ε X, where X 
is an index set and Cov is a pretopology. If a compatibility condition for germs on covers is 
satisfied then the stack F is a sheaf. The resultant construction is called a Grothendieck topos. We 
are actually going to only be using Grothendieck topoi as a stepping stone, so that, beyond naming 
them, we are not going to pursue the nature of such topoi. 
 
3. Categorical Modelling 
 
Now we pursue the modelling. The idea is to regard the base space as the temporal grid of nows, 
each of which is represented by an object, with the direction of the arrows indicating the future 
coming towards one at any given point in time. To clarify, the objects represent the onset of 
physical manifestation, the nows, and the arrows represent the transitions in deep time between 
nows that occur during the offset of physical manifestation.  
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The stacks can be interpreted as the experiential worlds that occur at any given now for a person. 
However, for the purposes of this modelling, we need to enrich the structure of the stacks, so we 
replace the sets that make up the stacks with elementary topoi. Elementary topoi are categories that 
are generalizations of both Grothendieck topoi and sets, with the word Aelementary@ referring to the 
fact that they are defined axiomatically in first-order logic. This is an additional mathematical 
feature introduced for the purposes of this modelling that is not part of existing sheaf constructions. 
Now the objects of topoi become the germs and we let them represent the meaning fields. The 
relationships between the meaning fields are captured by the arrows between the objects which, in 
Set, would just default to subsets, intersections, and so on. The point of using topoi rather than just 
categories of sets in this modelling is to signify the notion that the meaning of meaning fields is not 
exhausted by their informational content, in that an object of a topos need not have any elements, 
as sets do, and if it does, then they need not define the totality of an object=s dynamics. 
 
To represent the notion of a view from somewhere, we designate the terminal object in a topos in a 
stack as the subjective aspect of intentionality. The fact that there is a unique arrow from every 
object to the terminal object represents the idea that the meaning fields in a person=s psyche can 
influence the structure of her experience. In a topos there can also be arrows from the terminal 
object to other objects in a topos. Such arrows are called elements and represented by ε1, ε2, ε3, and 
so on. The contents of experience are going to be represented by these elements, thereby modelling 
the use of explicit or implicit attention to extract specific contents from meaning fields. Note that 
the metaphorical arrow of intentionality is modelled as an actual collection of arrows from the 
terminal object to objects in a topos. I call that collection a spray. It is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2
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Changes in a person=s experience from now to now are represented by changes to the spray. In 
other words, some elements disappear whereas others are added in the transition from one now to 
the next. To do this mathematically, I introduce the notion of a partial functor as a functor that 
acts on all of the objects and arrows of a topos except for the arrows that are not being carried 
forward. In other words, a partial functor, by definition, is a functor that acts on a subcategory of 
a category. Furthermore, we suppose that there is a collection of such partial functors f1F, f2F, f3F 
and so on, indexed by corresponding arrows f1, f2, f3 and so on, in the base category, that allows 
for all possible permutations of sprays. This is represented in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
An individual could end up in different nows with possibly different additional meaning fields. 
This can occur by being carried to a different future now by an arrow in the base space, say, arrow 
g rather than arrow f, with the meaning fields corresponding to the domain of g rather than the 
domain of f. This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
An individual could change realities more dramatically, as represented by shifting to a different 
contravariant functor at any given now, with the sprays being carried over to new ones by natural 
transformations, the morphisms that carry arrows to arrows across functors. This could represent 
shifting to a radically different reality with different pasts and futures. This becomes significant 
when considering how a person could dramatically alter reality from now to now. That is to say, 
there could be ways of using one=s volition to not only switch between meaning fields but change 
to a reality with different meaning fields (cf. Barušs, van Lier, & Ali, 2014). In Figure 5, natural 
transformations τ and σ carry sprays to the topoi in the image of the contravariant functor G, 
which represents a radically different version of reality. To keep the diagram simple, only a single 
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element from a spray is shown for each modified stack. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
Temporally, with regard to the base space, we can think of an individual going down all possible 
pathways, consistent with multiverse theories and relational quantum mechanics, or think of her 
as choosing a single path, consistent with collapse-type quantum theories. This modelling does 
not distinguish between those two alternative interpretations of quantum theory. 
 
4. Modelling Additional Features of Conscious States 
 
We have modelled the three core features of conscious states that we set out to model C 
temporality, the view from somewhere, and meaning fields C in a somewhat natural way. But 
these topos-theoretic structures are richly endowed with features that could also be used in the 
modelling. This section presupposes working familiarity with basic categorical constructions. 
 
Every topos carries internal logic, which could perhaps be fruitfully exploited. A basic example is 
that of assigning the value true whenever there is a monomorphism from a meaning field to 
another meaning field. In the topos Set this would mean that the value true is assigned whenever a 
meaning field is a subset of another meaning field. In particular, by the Ω-Axiom: for every 
monic f:ad there is a unique arrow χf:dΩ so that the diagram in Figure 6 is a pullback square. 
What this means is that the diagram takes the value true precisely when the meaning field 
represented by a is included in the meaning field represented by d. This means that an element of 
7
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a is also an element of d, and there is sufficient logical structure inside the model to assign a truth 
value to that relationship. There could be additional ways of exploiting the rich internal logic of 
topoi for modelling conscious states. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
 
There is good evidence for the occurrence of presentiment, a person=s anomalous ability to 
anticipate future events to which she has not been sensorially exposed (Bem, 2011; Barušs & 
Mossbridge, 2017). We recall the compatibility condition for sheaves and generalize it to our case 
in which the stacks made of sets have been replaced with stacks made of topoi. The idea is that if 
a meaning field exists in a suitable arrangement of future states, represented by a cover of an 
object in the base space, then that meaning field already exists in the stack over that object. In this 
way presentiment can be modelled. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
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There has been speculation that there is only a single subjective sense experienced as a 
multiplicity by individuals (Carse, 2005). We model such unity in diversity using the terminal 
object in the category of topoi, namely the degenerate topos, by considering a collection of 
functors from the degenerate topos to each of the topoi in the category that picks out the terminal 
object in each topos. In this way, all of the subjective senses are linked to a single subjective 
sense represented by the object in the degenerate topos. And we have modelled the idea there is 
only a single subjective self. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
With this modelling, I have represented nows as the objects of a base category, with stacks as the 
domain of experiential events. Meaning fields are the objects of the topoi that constitute the 
stacks. Subjectively experienced events are represented by sprays of elements in a topos stack. 
Changes to experienced events are represented by partial functors between the stacks. Radical 
transformation of reality is represented by natural transformations of contravariant functors. 
Presentiment is represented by an application of the compatibility condition for sheaves. And the 
notion of a universal self is represented by functors from the degenerate topos. This is an outline 
of a mathematical model of conscious states that could potentially be further developed as a 
somewhat different way of conceptualizing cognitive architecture, including the utilization of the 
internal logic of topoi. 
 
Note 
 
This paper is based on a talk ACategorical Modelling of Meaning Fields@ given by the author at 
the 51st Annual Meeting of the Society for Mathematical Psychology at the University of 
Wisconsin, Madison, July 21B24, 2018. 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
John Lane Bell came up with the idea of introducing the notion of a partial functor, so my 
gratitude to him for that contribution. I am also grateful to Menas Kafatos for his suggestions for 
improving this paper. I also thank Shannon Foskett for drawing the diagrams and for editing 
assistance, and King=s University College for research grants that enabled this paper’s production.  
 
References 
 
Abramsky, S. & Brandenburger, A. (2011). The sheaf-theoretic structure of non-locality and 
contextuality. ArXiv:1102.0264v7 [quant-ph] 29 Nov 2011 
Abramsky, S. & Coecke, B. (2008). Categorical quantum mechanics. arXiv:0808.1023v1 [quant-
ph] 7 Aug 2008 
Barbour, J. (2000). The end of time: The next revolution in physics. New York: Oxford 
9
: Categorical Modelling of Conscious States
Published by Digital Commons @ CIIS,
Consciousness: Ideas and Research for the Twenty First Century | Summer 2019 | Vol 7 | Issue 7 
Imants Barušs, Categorical Modelling of Conscious States 
 
 
Retrieved from https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/conscjournal/vol7/iss7/ 
ISSN 2575-5552  10 
 
 
University Press. 
Barušs, I. (1987). Metanalysis of definitions of consciousness. Imagination, Cognition and 
Personality, 6(4), 321B329. 
Barušs, I. (1989). Categorical modelling of Husserl's intentionality. Husserl Studies 6, 25B41. 
Barušs, I. (2008). Characteristics of consciousness in collapse-type quantum mind theories. 
Journal of Mind and Behavior, 29(3), 255B265. 
Barušs, I. (2018). Meaning fields: meaning beyond the human as a resolution of boundary 
problems introduced by nonlocality. EdgeScience, 35, 8B11. 
Barušs, I., Mossbridge, J. (2017). Transcendent mind: Rethinking the science of consciousness. 
Washington: American Psychological Association. 
Barušs, I., van Lier, C., & Ali, D. (2014). Alterations of consciousness at a self-development 
seminar: A Matrix Energetics seminar survey. Journal of Consciousness Exploration and 
Research, 5(11), 1064B1086. 
Bem, D. J. (2011). Feeling the future: Experimental evidence for anomalous retroactive 
influences on cognition and affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 100(3), 
407B425. 
Carse, D. (2005). Perfect brilliant stillness: Beyond the individual self. Salisbury, UK: Non-
Duality Press. 
Goldblatt, R. (1979). Topoi: The categorial analysis of logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Kafatos, M. C. & Kato, G. C. (2017). Sheaf theoretic formulation for consciousness and qualia 
and relationship to the idealism of non-dual philosophies. Progress in Biophysics and 
Molecular Biology, 131, 242B250. 
Mac Lane, S. (1971). Categories for the working mathematician. New York, Heidelberg, Berlin: 
Springer-Verlag. 
Nagel, T. (1986). The view from nowhere. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Struppa, D. C., Kafatos, M., Roy, S., Kato, G., and Amoroso, R. L. (2002). Category theory as the 
language of consciousness. Noetic Journal, 3(3), 271B281. 
 
10
CONSCIOUSNESS: Ideas and Research for the Twenty-First Century, Vol. 7 [], Iss. 7, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.ciis.edu/conscjournal/vol7/iss7/1
